miGrAciones desde el “sUr GlobAl” y lA economíA. informAl en [email protected] Recibido: laboral a países europeos y de Oriente Medio. Finalmente, se .. landmines dating from the s has risen to 72 within two years.” Crecimiento económico y equidad en Oriente Medio y Norte de África economía mundial dinámica, en la cual el sector privado juega un. Y también cuando aumentaba el dinamismo de su economía por la . Es cierto que una parte de esos inmigrantes proceden de un medio rural y poseen texto es la siguiente: "En la medida en que la desorganización oriente a la.
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Thus, Muslim World had two make a choice between an evil and a lesser evil. An analogy between the discourse on anti-democratic Catholicism and the experience of Latin America as bedrock of authoritarianism with anti-democratic Islam and the persistence of authoritarianism in Middle East is inspiring.
As part of the Monroe Doctrine, Latin America had always been a strategic place for American foreign policy. At least since Carter doctrine, the West prioritizes security over democracy in the region  and prefers pro-West autocrats. In this case, these autocrats are considered as the barrier against the Islamic movements.
One is forced hard not to make the analogy with the military dictators of Latin America who were considered as bulwark against leftist extremism during the Cold War, and the Middle Eastern autocrats who are considered as a set against Islamic extremism in the age of the "Clash of Civilizations".
We have already mentioned that Islamic groups are not in power in most of the authoritarian regimes. However, this is not to deny the fact that some, but definitely not all, of the Islamic opposition groups in these regimes also have authoritarian tendencies.
Esposito and Voll See gives us some important criteria to evaluate the diverse experiences of Muslim groups in these regions: The vast range of experiences show that the more chances to participate in the system the more pluralistic and democratic the Islamic groups they are. The country with the largest possible ways to participate in the system is Turkey, as the country has institutionalized a tradition of power change through election box. Despite all the major shortcomings of the democratic regime in turkey, it still enables to keep the Islamic groups in the system, and the country witnessed the emergence of JDP in the last decade as the major symbol of Muslim democracy through the region.
From this point on I will look at the government experience of JDP in Turkey, its significance for the debates on the compatibility of Islam and democracy, for the democratization experience of Turkey, and for the attempts of democratization in the Middle Eastern region.
A Testimony to the Secularization Thesis? I believe there are many factors that make Turkey an interesting empirical case aside from its long and complicated democratic transition period. Turkey is a paradigmatic case in many respects. First of all, Turkish state ideology is based on the emulation of secular French nation state model, and, in many aspects, Turkish secularism is even more radical than the French case.
Ernest Gellner argues that although Muslim World is an exception in general, Turkey is the exception to the exception, and he says that he was always "fascinated" by the Turkish experience of secularization and nation building See Gellner, They praise Turkey as a considerably democratic country, which achieved its status partially as a result of its strict policies on secularism.
This line of thought is based on the conviction that in Muslim countries achieving democratization is possible only through radical measures against any kind of religious freedom. Gellner, who considers that democracy has no chance in the Muslim World, argues that Turkish state is an exception, since historically powerful state tradition enabled the state to eliminate Islam and to nationalize its population.
This point is more eloquently described by Lewis in his classical Emergence of Modern Turkey. Lewis argues that "God had to be replaced twice: Transition to democracy in Turkey had been possible only because of this elimination of Islam, and because of the nationalization of the population. Thus, Turkey appears an empirical case that proves the necessity of secularization as a pre-requisite of democratization and normatively more important than democratization.
The power of this argument is so strong that it affects even the most careful observes. Note the extremely radical conception of distinguishing between religion and public sphere. This is obviously a much more radical understanding of secularism than a separation between state and religion, not to mention twin tolerations.
This view has wider implications for the whole Muslim World, as once Alfred Stepan and Robertson Graeme See pointed to Turkish democracy as a support for the compatibility of Islam and democracy, Sanford Lakoff See responded that that Turkey could not be counted as an example because it was a strictly secular country. The extension of this line of argument to the rest of the Muslim world, and particularly to the Arab world, is the hijacking of democracy by authoritarian secularists and the above mentioned unconditional support given the Arab secular autocrats by the Western democracies.
This glorification of Turkish success with modernization comes from a popular myth of Turkey being both the only secular and democratic country in the Muslim world. However, as it became apparent from the previous discussions, Turkey is neither the single secular state nor the most democratic state in the Muslim world.
Two countries, Indonesia and Senegal, rank higher both in the Freedom House survey and in the Polity surveys. Moreover, the country still maintains to be a very interesting case to investigate the relation between Islam and democracy as this assertively secular state is being ruled by an Islamic oriented party since SinceJDP enjoys a secure majority in the parliament and this will likely to continue in the forthcoming electionsand rules the country with a strong government.
Thus, a comparison of the democratic record of JDP with its more secular predecessors will likely to tell us much about the relation of Islam and democracy. Again, we can turn to the reliable Freedom House surveys for this comparison. These rankings would mean that Turkish democracy is still far from being perfect.
However, they also mean that Turkish democracy had continuously developed throughout the JDP rule. Despite the fact that Turkish democracy is far from being a consolidated democracy, Turkey has a long record of democratization. Since the start of multi party life inthree problems stayed at the center of Turkish politics: Obviously, this was a continuation of a long and constantly interrupted process of liberalization. Yet, in Marchthe Council of Europe determined that "Turkey had liberalized more in the first two years of JDP rule than in the previous ten years" See Smithp.¿Por qué QATAR es el país MÁS RICO del MUNDO? - VisualPolitik
We can map the religious affiliation of Turkey as falling into three essential groups: JDP appears as the representative of the majority Sunni sect and its policies in order to increase the freedom of Sunni groups, necessary for democratization, is not unexpected.
JDP has been able to diminish the anti-Christian discourse embedded in the official ideology and took various steps in order to increase the harmony between Muslim and non-Muslim populations. This appeasement policy involves more symbolic gestures as putting ethnic Armenians on the JDP ticket in the local elections, as well as many legal changes related to the restrictions that non-Muslims face.
On the legal bases, there has been important improvements, the most important being the passing of a new law on Religious Foundations in spring The limitations on the property rights of non-Muslim foundations were abolished, and some limited steps were taken to compensate for the previous confiscations.
Hate speech towards non-Muslims were declared violations of the law. Another significant change was the abolition of the ban on giving Christian names. The ruling JDP also took some steps for embracing the Alevi minority. JDP offered positions to prominent Alevis in the party organs, and also nominated them in the parliamentary elections. Since last year, the government is conducting a series of workshops with the Alevi community that aims to address the problems of this religious minority in the country.
The topics that these workshops aim to handle include the core issues such as rewriting books on religion which is announced to be accomplished the following year and the financing of religious Alevi institutions. Although no concrete policy improvements have been accomplished yet, it appears that the allegedly Islamist JDP is again much more understanding towards Alevis compared to its secular rivals.
Although JDP is frequently criticized by the old guard for having a hidden Islamist agenda and accused of trying to convert the country into a fundamentalist Islamist state, no serious observers of Turkish politics share this concern.
There are also influential policy circles that insist that JDP is not so different from Taliban in terms of its actual policies See Pipes,quoted in Yavuz, Considering the JDP policies on non-Muslims, in a country where xenophobia has dominated the political culture for decades, the only explanation for conducting parallels between Taliban and JDP would be an outright discontent not for Islamic fundamentalism, but any source of Islamic visibility. Such a vision that asks for the exclusion of religious people from the political system in Muslim majority countries transforms the democracy to an "impossible game" See Casanovap.
Although limited, the overall success of JDP in democratic politics, compared to its secularist predecessors, not only points that Islamic oriented groups can adapt to electoral democracy; it also shows that they can also contribute to advance pluralist democracy.
Thus, it had long time effects for the deepening of democratic values and an increase in the quality of democracy. Moreover, such a legitimization of democracy is not limited to the conservative Turks. More importantly, Islamic groups under the authoritarian Arab regimes are also influenced by the JDP model.
The continuous betterment of democratization in countries like Indonesia and Turkey under the Islamic oriented governments, and the effects of these Muslim democracies on the people of autocratic regimes, leading to a series of revolts throughout the Arab world, remind us that despite the overall low level of democratization of the Islamic world there are reasons to be optimistic.
As one of the most evident examples of the multivocality of Islam, there are certain distinctions between two major sects; the majority Sunnis and the minority Shias. Unlike the dominant Sunni Islam, in Shia version of Islam, there is a strong class of clergy, with a strict hierarchy among them. However, the idea that the clergy should be ruling the country is a quite novel interpretation for the centuries old Shia theology.
Even then, it was not accepted by the highest authorities of Shia Islam. At the time of the Iranian revolution, among a dozen Grand Ayatollahs the highest level in the hierarchy of Shia clergy only one other than Khomeini approved this theory. The Shia school considers only one of the four caliphs successors as legitimate. Thus, their objection to democracy is more rhetorical rather than substantial. In the past, many Islamic movements that consider free and fair elections as the only way of coming to power did not stick to the democratization discourse.
As a response to this insistence, a new attempt to formulate Muslim modernity and attempts of Muslims democracy had come to forefront. JDP of Tukey represents a striking example.
What is novel for the JDP cadres is not their leaning for political freedoms which they had started to do that long agobut formulating these demands for freedoms through democratization discourse is novel.
For this distinction between political freedom and democratization see Hefner, According to this view, Islam is incompatible with a series of concepts all of them which are considered to be a whole scale package coined in the Western experience of modernization. The list of concepts alien to the Islamic world includes: This worthy of note insofar as Catholicism was perceived as an obstacle to democratization only a few decades ago.
It would be an interesting exercise to check the texts written on the relationship of Catholicism and modernity, democratization, nationalism, capitalism etc. If one looks today at the texts written a few decades ago on the relation between Catholicism and democracy, and replaces the word Catholicism with Islam, one would see that almost same sentences are written today on the relationship of Islam and democracy.
In that sense, it is interesting to see that Huntington, Gellner, and Lewis share the same approach to Islam with the fundamentalists. However, the number 46 is open to debate and this number shows slight changes throughout various reports prepared at different times due to the existence of some borderline cases such as Nigeria, Sierra Leona, Burkina Faso and Eritrea.
The total population of these three states makes millions.
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Aside from other smaller electoral democracies in the Muslim world, like Senegal, Bosnia, and Albania, Stepan also includes the million Indian Muslims who, though constituting a minority in India, had contributed immensely to the democratic system of the country. According to Wittfogelquoted in Norton,absence of a civil society to counterbalance despotic power was a marker of oriental society, and it is this lacuna that lies at the heart of the orientalist analysis.
Indeed, most of these movements are better called "nativists" See Westad, Thus, one wonders how we would label the so called fundamentalists in the Muslim world after a few decades from now on.
JDP had maintained civilian supremacy over military; a definite criteria for any democracy. The government also dealt with the Kurdish problem. InPrime Minister Erdogan paid a controversial visit to the Kurdish town Diyarbakir where he declared that he recognized the existence of the Kurdish problem, a brave statement, as the official discourse in Turkey for decades denied not only the existence of a Kurdish problem but also the existence of Kurds as a distinct people.
Since then, government took a series of attempts though far from being sufficient for the peaceful solution of the Kurdish problem. Alevi Islam diverges from Sunni Islam for its tendency for heterodoxy. The parliament had to re-accept the amendment in order to overrule the veto. Until this amendment, Kurdish names were also illegal, and it was obligatory for the parents to name their children in Turkish. Now, there is no official restriction on either ethnic or religious minorities. Civil Society, Democracy and the Middle East.
Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2 3 Formations of the Secular: Rice Calls for Mid-East Democracy [on line]. Brumberg, Daniel and Larry Diamond.
Islam and Democracy in the Middle East pp. Johns Hopkins University Press. Public Religions in the Modern World. Civil Society and Religion: Social Research, 68 4 Daedalus, 1 The Justice and Development Party: Emergence of New Turkey pp. University of Utah Press. Esposito, John and John Voll. Civil Society and Its Rivals. Modernity and the Remaking of Muslim Politics. Pluralism, Contestation, Democratization pp. Heper, Metin and Sule Toktas.
Islam, Modernity, and Democracy in Contemporary Turkey: The Case of Recep Tayyip Erdogan. The Muslim World, 93 2 Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. University of Oklahoma Press. Islamist Notions of Democracy. Middle East Report, Passive and Assertive Secularism: World Politics, Baltimore, 59 4 The Reality of Muslim Exceptionalism. Journal of Democracy, 15 4 For the Soul of Mankind: The Emergence of Modern Turkey. London and New York: Linz, Juan and Alfred Stepan.
Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Civil Society and Islam. History, Theory, Comparison pp. Middle East Journal, 47 2 Civil Society in the Middle East. How Far from Consolidation. Journal of Democracy, 7 3 Journal of Democracy, 15 2 Prospects for Civil Society in the Middle East: An Analysis of Cultural Impediments. Elizabeth Ozdalga and Sune Persson Eds.
Myths and Realities on Islam and Democracy in the Middle East
Civil Society Democracy and the Muslim World pp. Civic Nationalism and Ethocultural Justice in Turkey. Human Rights Quarterly, 27, Crafting the Twin Tolerations. Arguing Comaparative Politics pp.
Stepan, Alfred and Robertson B. Journal of Democracy, 14 3 Arab, Not Muslim, Exceptionalism. Islam and Democracy in Turkey. Turkish Studies, 6 2 The global Cold War: Cambridge and New York: Eso daba oportunidades a los inmigrantes varones. Pero no por ello los movimientos inmigratorios desaparecieron. Las estructuras familiares dominantes en muchas sociedades, por ejemplo, en la europea, implican que una parte de los hijos deban abandonar la casa paterna para establecerse por separado.
La ciudad ha sido siempre el lugar de la libertad, un lugar de refugio para los pobres y desarraigados. La ciudad ha sido con frecuencia el espacio de la coexistencia y del mestizaje. Lo que no se ha producido sin dolor y dificultades. En la ciudad americana hispanocolonial, las ciudades eran el lugar de coexistencia, convivencia y conflicto de grupos raciales numerosos.
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En Estados Unidos la llegada de inmigrantes durante el siglo XIX supuso, lo hemos dicho, la arribada de contingentes de origen y culturas muy diversas. La convivencia, el intercambio, el conocimiento mutuo avanza. La ciudad transforma a los llegados, pero se enriquece y transforma al mismo tiempo con ellos. Respecto a esto los datos son igualmente concluyentes.
Las posibilidades que ofrece la ciudad en ese sentido son siempre infinitamente mayores que las que se dan en el campo. De manera semejante, el papel de los inmigrantes en el desarrollo de la ciudad ha sido reconocido multitud de veces.
Sobre todo de las ciudades norteamericanas en general 32y respecto a algunas en particular, como Nueva York. Es el caso, por ejemplo, de Barcelona. De un total de escritores barceloneses de los siglos XVI al XIX 36los porcentajes de nacidos fuera de Barcelona ha sido los siguientes: Los grupos marginales o vencidos se situaban normalmente en lugares aparte: Como resultado de ello, los miembros de una raza tienden a pensar que son diferentes de otros grupos de personas, y los otros grupos pueden tratarlos como si realmente lo fueran.
En ese sentido puede ser un sentimiento beneficioso. Incluso puede decirse que en nuestro siglo son menores, especialmente en la ciudad industrial, debido al establecimiento del Estado de Bienestar. Aunque, naturalmente, pueden aumentar con el desmantelamiento del mismo, si se produce. En el caso de Barcelona los problemas no son especialmente graves, si comparamos con otras ciudades europeas o americanas.
La importancia creciente del conocimiento en esta sociedad hace que adquiera un papel decisivo la mano de obra calificada.
En esencia, hemos de distinguir entre dos tipos de migraciones.
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En segundo lugar, los inmigrantes de origen extranjero. En el censo de los inscritos en el censo eran En eran ya En la cifra de oficialmente inscritos era de La paradoja es que, por un lado esos trabajadores extranjeros se siguen necesitando: O para prescindir de ellos si resulta necesario. Que es precisamente lo que ha ocurrido con los inmigrantes: Cuando los grupos de viejos, desempleados, inmigrantes, pobres tienen localizaciones segregadas eso se debe en buena parte a las rentas limitadas que les impiden elegir otras localizaciones.
Especialmente importantes pueden ser los conflictos entre viejos y nuevos inmigrantes. En primer lugar entre los viejos inmigrantes nacionales, ya integrados en la ciudad, pero afectados por problemas de desempleo, y los nuevos inmigrantes, nacionales o extranjeros.